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Ben W. Lieberman
The Lieberman Law Firm
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INTRODUCTION
The instant request for supplemental briefing presents a very narrow issue of first
impression: How does a state’s continuing jurisdiction in a divorce case mesh with a stipulated,
non-child-related non-disparagement clause contained in a final, but non-adjudicated decree of
divorce. First, principles of res judicata are inapplicable regarding the instant issue because of a
trial court’s very broad discretionary powers as clearly established by this Court and because the
nature of disparagement in a divorce action is likely to require post-decree adjudication.
No party should lose their right to modify a disparagement clause set forth in a decree of
divorce due to the nature of what a disparagement clause seeks to address. In light of technological
advances, more and more divorcing litigants agree to non-disparagement clauses. Finally, in light
of statute, case law, and sound public policy, district courts should have continuing jurisdiction on
matters such as the narrow issue set forth in this Court’s Supplemental Briefing Order in this
matter.
ARGUMENTS

I.

RES JUDICATA IS RENDERED INAPPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE DUE TO A TRIAL COURTS BROAD DISCRETIONARY
POWERS, ONLY TO BE DISTURBED IN THE PRESENCE OF CLEAR
ABUSE

In 1978, this Court held in Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978) that, pursuant to
the operative section 30-3-5, a showing of substantial post-decree change in circumstances makes the doctrine of
res judicata inapplicable. In the instant matter, as shown herein, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction because
of its broad discretionary powers. Utah Courts have long upheld the arguments in support of continuing
jurisdiction over divorce matters when public policy suggests parties may need the court’s assistance. An
example of the broad discretionary powers of the district court, this Court has held that merely because the

divorce judgment is silent on alimony, does not mean a final order cannot be modified with respect to alimony.
See Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 213-16 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Jackson, J., concurring) (construing Utah’s
divorce modification statutes to allow alimony to be awarded at modification because court has continuing
jurisdiction over divorce decree and that decree is only res judicata as to circumstances as they exist at the time of
divorce, not as to changed circumstances requiring further adjudication). The instant case highlights the need of a
district court to maintain continuing jurisdiction over the non-disparagement clause at issue. Continuing
jurisdiction over a non-disparagement clause in a decree of divorce in the age of the internet will likely require
further adjudication.
District courts in Utah should continue to have the broad discretionary powers this Court has upheld. See
Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303, 1305-06 (Utah 1980) (“Under Utah law, a divorce court sits as a court in
equity so far as child custody, support payments, and the like are concerned. It likewise retains continuing
jurisdiction over the parties, and power to make equitable redistribution or other modification of the original
decree as equity might dictate. In both the formulation of the original decree and any modifications thereof, the
trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers, which may be disturbed by an appellate court only in the
presence of clear abuse thereof.”).

II.

THE COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO MODIFY OR
EXPAND A STIPULATED, NON-CHILD-RELATED NONDISPARAGEMENT CLAUSE CONTAINED IN A NON-ADJUDICATED
DECREE OF DIVORCE

a. Although the issue for which this court seeks supplemental briefing is an issue of first
impression in Utah, strong legal basis in the form of statutes and case law lend support to district
courts retaining continuing jurisdiction regarding a non-disparagement clause between the
divorcing parties and not related to minor children. Today’s social and technological changes pose
yet another serious question for this Court. In this case, the Court should lead the nation on this
issue and thereby keep up with social and technological changes that can so widely impact a
divorcing party’s life. As in this case, a former spouse can broadcast with the internet disparaging
comments about their ex-spouse as far as Europe and China.

If this Court decides a trial court does not have continuing jurisdiction over the subject
matter in dispute, it means the parties reached an agreement that is now henceforth eternally etched
in stone; rather, a trial court should have continuing jurisdiction, once the requisite material changes
are pled, weigh the changes in light of the disparagement clause to determine if expansion or
restriction is needed. As in this case, spousal disparagement can have far-reaching consequences
that may impact another party financially; ex-spouse hold a special position of trust to learn
intimate details about their ex-spouse that can be exploited or used to embarrass widely.
b. District Court’s in Utah have continuing jurisdiction over personal property. In Utah,
personal property includes non-tangible property such as copyrights, patents, or trademarks. One’s
reputation is tantamount to personal property and one must literally be more vigilant in the age of
the Internet to protect one’s image. The operative section of the Utah Code allows for this reading:
“The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders . . . for
distribution of the property . . . as is reasonable and necessary. Utah Code 30-3-5(3)

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Court should find there is continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of November, 2019.
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